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This research experimentally examined the effects of exposure to intergroup conspiracy
theories on prejudice and discrimination. Study 1 (N = 166) demonstrated that exposure
to conspiracy theories concerning immigrants to Britain from the European Union (vs.
anti-conspiracy material or a control) exacerbated prejudice towards this group. Study 2
(N = 173) found the same effect in a different intergroup context – exposure to
conspiracy theories about Jewish people (vs. anti-conspiracy material or a control)
increased prejudice towards this group and reduced participants’ willingness to vote for a
Jewish political candidate. Finally, Study 3 (N = 114) demonstrated that exposure to
conspiracy theories about Jewish people not only increased prejudice towards this group
but was indirectly associated with increased prejudice towards a number of secondary
outgroups (e.g., Asians, Arabs, Americans, Irish, Australians). The current research
suggests that conspiracy theories may have potentially damaging and widespread
consequences for intergroup relations.
Conspiracy theories explain the ultimate causes of significant events as the secret
actions of malevolent groups, who cover up information to suit their own interests (e.g.,
Douglas, Sutton, & Cichocka, 2017; Goertzel, 1994; McCauley & Jacques, 1979). For
example, popular conspiracy theories propose that climate change is a hoax orches-
trated by the world’s scientists to secure research funding, that Diana, Princess of Wales,
was murdered by members of the British government, and that Jewish people have a
controlling and sinister influence over world affairs. A growing body of research suggests
that conspiracy theories are popular (Oliver & Wood, 2014), that they are associated
with a variety of psychological traits (e.g., Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory,
1999; Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010), and that they have important
political, social, and health-related consequences (e.g., Jolley & Douglas, 2014a,b). In the
current research, we focus on the consequences of conspiracy theories for relations
between groups. We argue that exposure to intergroup conspiracy theories may be
damaging not just because they serve to increase prejudice and discrimination towards
the implicated group, but because this prejudice then has the potential to spread across
multiple social outgroups.
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The psychology of conspiracy theories
In recent years, psychologists have made significant progress in understanding why
people believe conspiracy theories (see Douglas et al., 2017). Specifically, it seems that
people often believe conspiracy theories in an effort to gain an accurate and consistent
understanding of the world. For example, findings show that factors such as the need for
cognitive closure (Marchlewska, Cichocka, & Kossowska, 2018), uncertainty (van
Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013), and the tendency to search for patterns (van Prooijen,
Douglas, & De Inocencio, 2018) are all associated with heightened conspiracy belief.
Conspiracy theories, therefore, appear toprovide answerswhenpeoplewant to know the
truth about important events.
Research suggests that people might also believe conspiracy theories in an attempt to
meet their personal needs for security and control. Along this vein, research has shown
that people turn to conspiracy theories when they are anxious (Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013),
feel powerless (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; van Prooijen & Acker, 2015; Whitson &
Galinsky, 2008), or lack socio-political control (Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, &
Imhoff, 2013). Conspiracy theories may therefore allow people to feel that they are
restoring a sense of control and security – they provide ameans to reject information from
officialdom and also allow people to feel that they possess an alternative account.
Finally, research suggests that there are also important social reasons to believe
conspiracy theories. For instance, research has shown that conspiracy theories appeal
more to narcissists (Cichocka, Marchlewska, & Golec de Zavala, 2016) and ‘losers’ of
political processes (Uscinski & Parent, 2014), who are both arguably motivated to defend
or restore their sense of self-esteem or feeling of group worth. There is, therefore, a
growing body of literature highlighting the psychological needs that appear to drive
conspiracy belief (Douglas et al., 2017).
Consequences of conspiracy theories
Less is known about the consequences of conspiracy theories. Emerging findings suggests
that conspiracy theories might have potentially serious social and political outcomes. For
example, HIV-related conspiracy beliefs amongst African American communities have
been found to be associated with negative attitudes towards contraceptives and safe-sex
practices (e.g., Bogart & Thorburn, 2006; Hoyt et al., 2012). There is also evidence that
exposure to conspiracy theories influences civic engagement. Specifically, Jolley and
Douglas (2014a,b see also Douglas, Sutton, Jolley, &Wood, 2015) found that exposure to
conspiracy theories makes people feel less inclined to vote, less inclined to reduce their
carbon footprint, and less inclined towards vaccination. Also, conspiracy theories in the
workplace have been linked with reduced job satisfaction and increased turnover
intentions (Douglas & Leite, 2017; see also Van Prooijen & de Vries, 2016).
In the present research, we focus specifically on the consequences of conspiracy
theories for intergroup relations. Initial findings hint at the negative consequences of
exposure to conspiracy theories in this domain. For instance, in recent correlational
research, belief in conspiracy theories about Jewish domination of the world has been
found to be associated with anti-Semitic attitudes (e.g., Golec de Zavala & Cichocka,
2012; Kofta & Sezdek, 2005). Similarly, Bilewicz, Winiewski, Kofta, and Wojcik (2013)
reported that conspiracy stereotypes of Jewish people –which refer to social schemas of
groups that typically view group members with ill intentions – are a strong predictor of
discrimination towards Jewish people (e.g., favouring policies that prevent Jewish
people from buying Polish land, see also Bilewicz & Krzeminski, 2010). These findings
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point to an association between conspiracy beliefs and prejudice towards an alleged
conspiring outgroup.
The present research employed an experimental design to investigate the causal
impact of conspiracy theories on intergroup prejudice. Correlational results cannot rule
out the possibility that effects exist only because people who harbour high levels of
prejudice are more likely to endorse conspiracy theories about the implicated group.
Indeed, believing in conspiracy theories could be an avenue to express prejudice towards
other social groups and help maintain self-esteem (c.f. Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner,
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, &Wetherell, 1987). On the other hand, it is plausible that exposure
to conspiracy theories may increase prejudice towards the implicated group. Intergroup
threat theory posits that threats to the ingroup promote negative evaluations of outgroups
(Stephan& Stephan, 2000). A distinction can bemade between realistic threat (perceived
threat to ingroup welfare) and symbolic threat (perceived threat to ingroup values). The
link between both types of threat and prejudice is well established. Conspiracy theories
typify the outgroup as a collective conspirator that threatens themajority group’s welfare
or values (see Campion-Vincent, 2005; Moscovici, 1987). Accordingly, the present
research sought to explore the potential for exposure to outgroup conspiracy narratives
to increase self-reported prejudice towards these groups.
We also sought to extend the existing literature by examining whether the effects of
conspiracy theories on intergroup attitudes extend beyond the group implicated in the
conspiracy, to increase prejudice towards other, uninvolved outgroups. Attitudes
towards particular objects can generalize to other related objects (e.g., Fazio, Eiser, &
Shook, 2004;Walther, 2002). In the intergroup relations literature, research demonstrates
that the attitudinal consequences of our encounters with outgroup members can
generalize to the outgroup as awhole, and from there to other, secondary outgroups. This
effect is known as a secondary transfer effect (Pettigrew, 2009). Positive contact with
immigrants, for instance, has been shown to produce secondary reductions in prejudice
towards homosexual people and homeless people (Pettigrew, 2009). Similarly, contact
between Catholics and Protestants in northern Ireland has been shown to improve
attitudes not just towards the religious outgroup, but also towards racial minority groups
(Tausch et al., 2010). Effects emerge via a process of attitude generalization in which
intergroup contact improves attitudes towards the primary outgroup, and these more
positive attitudes then generalize to other, uninvolved outgroups (Pettigrew, 2009;
Tausch et al., 2010). Emerging findings suggest that such attitude generalization effects
also occur for negative intergroup encounters (Brylka, Jasinskaja-Lahti, &M€ah€onen, 2016;
Harwood, Paolini, Joyce, Rubin, & Arroyo, 2011).
When applied to the domain of conspiracy theories, we may observe a similar
process in which exposure to conspiracy theories regarding one outgroup not only
increases prejudice towards this group but this prejudice then spreads also towards
other, uninvolved outgroups. Some initial correlational research provides initial support
for this idea. For example, Kofta and Sezdek (2005) found that conspiracy stereotypes of
Jewish people were a strong predictor of prejudices held towards Jewish, German, and
Russian people. Swami (2012) also observed in a Malay sample that belief in Jewish
conspiracy theories was negatively associated with attitudes towards Chinese people.
However, as discussed by Swami (2012), it has been suggested that Jewish conspiracy
theories in Malaysia reflect displaced resentment of Chinese people (Burhanuddin,
2007; Hadler, 2004; Siegel, 2000); thus, the reported link with Jewish conspiracy
theories may be a mask for anti-Chinese prejudice. The novelty of our approach lies in
our experimental method, allowing us to isolate the causal impact of exposure to
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conspiracy theories relating to a given outgroup on prejudice towards both this
outgroup and other, uninvolved outgroups.
The present research
Previous research has demonstrated how conspiracy theories can prevent individuals
from engaging in society in a positive way, and an emerging literature points to the
potentially damaging effect of conspiracy theories for intergroup relations. Existing cross-
sectional research has tested predictormodels (e.g., Bilewicz et al., 2013; Golec de Zavala
&Cichocka, 2012)where evidence has shown that belief in conspiracy theories related to
a particular outgroup is associated with increased prejudice and discrimination towards
that group. In the current research, we sought to provide an experimental examination of
the impact of exposure to conspiracy theories on intergroup attitudes. Specifically, Study
1 and Study 2 tested the hypothesis that exposure to conspiracy theories would increase
prejudice towards the target outgroup. This hypothesis was tested in two different
intergroup contexts, specifically where immigrantswere the alleged conspiratorial group
(Study 1) andwhere Jewish peoplewere the alleged conspirators (Study 2). In Study 2,we
also examined whether exposure to conspiracy theories would lead directly to
discrimination (anti-voting bias). In Study 3, we then examined how increased prejudice
as a function of conspiracy theories may spread even beyond the target outgroup. We
report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions in these studies, either within the text
or a footnote.
STUDY 1
Study 1 aimed to provide the first evidence of the causal impact of conspiracy theories
on prejudice within a timely and important real-world context. We focused on popular
conspiracy theories relating to Muslim immigration, and attempts to ‘Islamicize’ Europe
(Swami, Barron, Weis, & Furnham, 2018; also see €Unal, 2016). Participants were
exposed to a conspiracy narrative regarding immigrants’ involvement in terrorist
organizations (e.g., ISIS), and their plots to attack Britain from within (e.g., Burke, 2016;
Vermaat, 2013). In an experimental design adapted from Jolley and Douglas (2014a,b),
participants were asked to read one of three arguments: (1) conspiracy arguments, (2)
anti-conspiracy arguments, or (3) a control condition where no information was given.
Following the manipulation, participants rated their beliefs in the conspiracy theory
and their prejudice towards immigrants.
Method
Participants and design
One hundred and eighty-one participants (80 men and 101 women, Mage = 36.40,
SD = 12.81) were recruited online via a UK-based online participant database, Prolific
Academic, which is similar to Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants were all residents
of the United Kingdom and received a small fee in exchange for their participation. Some
exclusions were made. Specifically, participants were required to be British citizens who
were currently living in the United Kingdom. Participants who either failed an attention
screen or spent less than 30 s reading the conspiracy-related information were removed
from the analysis. The final sample size used for data analysis was 166 (96 women and 70
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men, Mage = 36.72, SD = 12.90). Participants were randomly assigned to either a pro-
conspiracy condition (n = 50), anti-conspiracy condition (n = 57), or control condition
(n = 59) in a between-subjects design. Prior to data analysis, an anticipated small–medium
effect size (g2) of 0.059 based on previous research (e.g., Jolley & Douglas, 2014a,b)
required a sample size of approximately 150 for 80% power of detecting the effect (Clark-
Carter, 1997). Anticipating participant dropout, we recruited a sample of 181.
Materials and procedure
To begin the experiment, participants were exposed to either information that
supported conspiracy theories concerning immigrants’ involvement in activities aimed
to undermine the safety of British society (pro-conspiracy condition) or information that
refuted this conspiracy theory (anti-conspiracy condition). A control condition was also
included, where no information was given (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a,b). The pro-
conspiracy article began by arguing that there are many reasons to be suspicious of
immigrants. The article then continued to provide specific examples such as immigrants
have been found to be working on behalf of terrorist organizations. An extract from the
conspiracy article was as follows:
. . .Many argue that immigrants are actively working, in secret, with terrorist organisations to
spark a cyber-attack on British society. There is ample evidence supporting this view . . .
The anti-conspiracy article was similar in content and length to the pro-conspiracy
article but differed by arguing that there are few reasons to be suspicious of immigrants
being involved with terrorist organizations. An extract from the anti-conspiracy theory
article was as follows:
. . .Despite detailed investigations in other countries, immigrants have never been discovered
within secret terrorist organisations. . .Why would this be any different here in the UK? . . .
The term ‘conspiracy theory’ was not mentioned in either of the articles. After
completing the manipulation, participants then indicated their belief in conspiracy
theories relating to immigrants by way of a manipulation check. Belief in the conspiracy
theories was measured with four items (‘Immigrants are working within secret networks
on behalf of ISIS’, ‘Immigrants are working with terrorist groups to eventually attack
British society from within’, ‘Immigrants are often involved in secret plots and schemes
intended to disrupt British society’, and ‘Immigrants do not work together to support
terrorist organisations*’, a = .91) on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Next, participants completed a measure of prejudice towards immigrants. Participants
were asked to describe immigrants on five semantic differentialword pairings on a 7-point
scale (beautiful–ugly, good–bad, pleasant–unpleasant, honest–dishonest, and nice–
awful, adapted to the immigrant target group from Hummert, Garstka, O’Brien,
Greenwald, & Mellott, 2002). Items were coded such that a higher score corresponded
to higher prejudice (a = .94).1 Finally, participants completed the attention screen and
were debriefed, thanked, and paid. Full materials are available upon request.
1 Factor analysis was conducted on the immigrant conspiracy theory and prejudice scales. Statistical assumptions were met, and
the analysis revealed two factors with eigenvalues >1, explaining 61.81% and 18.62% of the variance, respectively. Each
component showed strong loadings on the rotated solution, and each item loaded substantially on the predicted scale.
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Results and discussion
Manipulation check
A one-way ANOVA confirmed the effect of exposure to conspiracy theories (pro-
conspiracy vs. anti-conspiracy vs. control) on belief in conspiracy theories, F(2,
163) = 7.50, p = .001, g2 = .10. Pairwise comparisons revealed that conspiracy belief
was significantly higher in the pro-conspiracy condition (M = 3.50, SD = 1.70) compared
to both the anti-conspiracy condition (M = 2.54, SD = 1.36, p < .001, d = .62) and the
control condition (M = 2.53, SD = 1.37, p = .001, d = .63). The manipulation was
therefore successful. In linewith previous research, therewas no difference in conspiracy
belief between the anti-conspiracy condition and control condition (p = .972; Jolley &
Douglas, 2017).
Exposure to immigrant conspiracy theories and prejudice
A second ANOVA then examined the effect of exposure to conspiracy theories on
prejudice. A significant omnibus effect of condition on prejudice was observed, F(2,
163) = 3.68, p = .027, g2 = .04. Pairwise comparisons demonstrated that prejudice was
significantly higher in the pro-conspiracy condition (M = 3.98, SD = 1.00) compared to
both the anti-conspiracy (M = 3.56, SD = 0.96, p = .023, d = .43) and the control
condition (M = 3.53, SD = 0.88, p = .016, d = .50). There were no differences in
prejudice between the anti-conspiracy condition and control (p = .899, d = .00).
The results of Study 1 provide the first experimental demonstration of the impact of
exposure to intergroup conspiracy theories on prejudice.2 Previous research has
provided evidence of a cross-sectional association between conspiracy beliefs and
prejudice (e.g., Golec de Zavala &Cichocka, 2012; Kofta & Sezdek, 2005). Bymanipulating
exposure to conspiracy theories in an experimental design, we can confirm the causal
relationship between conspiracy theories and prejudice towards an alleged conspiring
outgroup.
STUDY 2
Study 2 sought to replicate this effect in a different intergroup context. Previous research
suggests an association between Jewish conspiracy stereotypes and anti-Semitic attitudes
(e.g., Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012; Kofta & Sezdek, 2005). In the current
investigation, we aimed to provide causal evidence of this effect by demonstrating that
exposure to Jewish conspiracy theories can increase prejudice towards this group. We
also included a measure of discrimination. Specifically, we asked participants whether or
not they would vote for a Jewish candidate in an election. We predicted and tested a
simple mediational model in which exposure to conspiracy theories relating to Jewish
2 A mediation analysis was also conducted to examine whether the effect of exposure to conspiracy theories on prejudice is
explained by increased belief in conspiracy theories relating to immigrants. This was carried out using Hayes’ (2013)
bootstrapping method for indirect effects, using PROCESS Model 4, including one mediator with 5,000 bootstrapped resamples
and a 95%confidence interval. Because the independent variable had three levels, indicator codingwas used to create two dummy
variables. The pro-conspiracy conditionwas coded as the reference group andwas compared to the anti-conspiracy condition (D1)
and control (D2) separately. Results confirmed that the indirect effect was significant in both cases. When compared to both the
anti-conspiracy condition and the control condition, exposure to conspiracy theories increased prejudice towards immigrants via
increases in belief in conspiracy theories.
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people would increase anti-Semitic prejudice which then would increase discrimination
towards this group.
Method
Participants and design
One hundred and eighty-nine participants (99 men, 85 women, 4 trans/other, and 1 who
did not report their gender) were recruited online via Prolific Academic. Participants
were all residents of the United Kingdom and received a small fee in exchange for their
participation. As in Study 1, participants completed attention check items and a timerwas
also used to identify participants who had spent less than 30 s reading the conspiracy
theory material. Participants who failed these screening measures were removed from
analyses, alongside participants who also indicated that they were of Jewish origin. The
final sample size used for data analysis was 173 (81 women, 88 men, and 4 trans/other,
Mage = 31.12, SD = 10.73). Participants were randomly assigned to either the pro-
conspiracy condition (n = 57), anti-conspiracy condition (n = 56), or control condition
(n = 60) in a between-subjects design. Similarly, to Study 1, an anticipated small–medium
effect size (g2) of 0.059 required a sample size of approximately 150 for 80% power of
detecting the effect (Clark-Carter, 1997). Anticipating participant dropout, we recruited a
final sample of 189.
Materials and procedure
As in Study 1, participants were presented with either pro-conspiracy information, anti-
conspiracy information, or a no information control condition. The pro-conspiracy article
suggested that Israel orchestrated attacks on the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001. An
extract from the conspiracy article was as follows:
. . .one reason is that many Jewish employees in the Twin Towers were not at work on
September 11th, suggesting that they were pre-warned by Israeli intelligence that the attacks
were going to happen. . .
The anti-conspiracy article was similar in content to the pro-conspiracy article but
differed by arguing that there are few reasons to doubt the official account of events. An
extract from the anti-conspiracy theory article was as follows:
. . .there is no evidence to suggest that Jewish employees in the Twin Towers were absent
from work on that day and that they were pre-warned about the attacks by Israeli
intelligence. . .
As in Study 1, the term ‘conspiracy theory’ was not mentioned in either of the
articles. After completing the manipulation, participants completed a manipulation
check where belief in conspiracy theories about Jewish people was measured with five
items (e.g., ‘Jewish people have controlled other international affairs for decades’;
‘Israeli intelligence officers pre-warned Jewish employees about the attacks on the
Twin Towers’; ‘Jewish people have a controlling influence over international affairs,
such as finance and the film industry’, a = .86) on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree). Participants then completed the dependent variables relating to
prejudice. First, participants rated Jewish people on the semantic differential word
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pairings as used in Study 1 (e.g., beautiful–ugly, a = .94).3 Second, a measure of
stereotypes was included, where participants were asked to complete four sentences
(‘how [insert adjective] are Jewish people?’, adapted from Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick
(2007) on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very) scale, which measured competence (competent,
capable; Spearman–Brown coefficient = .96) and warmth (warm, friendly; Spearman–
Brown coefficient = .95). Third, participants were then asked to complete a measure
of dehumanization, where participants were asked to rate ‘how much Jewish people
are likely to feel each of the emotions’ (adapted from Vezzali, Capozza, Stathi, &
Giovannini, 2012). Participants were asked to rate uniquely human (positive: hope,
pride, and negative: remorse, shame; a = .84) and non-uniquely human (positive:
pleasure, excitement, and negative: anger, fear; a = .90) emotions on a 1 (not at all) to
7 (very) scale. Each of the prejudice measures was counterbalanced. Finally, as a
measure of discrimination, participants completed an anti-Jewish voting bias measure
(adapted from Bilewicz et al., 2013). Participants were asked to indicate whether they
would vote for a Jewish candidate within a parliamentary election from 1 (would vote)
to 7 (would not vote). To conclude the experiment, participants completed the
attention screen and were then debriefed, thanked, and paid.
Results and discussion
Manipulation check
Exposure to conspiracy theories was shown to have the expected influence on belief in
Jewish conspiracy theories, F(2, 170) = 21.51, p < .001, g2 = .25. Specifically, belief in
Jewish conspiracy theories was significantly higher in the conspiracy condition
(M = 2.78, SD = 1.45) than the anti-conspiracy condition (M = 1.48, SD = 1.55,
p < .001, d = .87) and the control condition (M = 1.93, SD = 1.00, p < .001, d = .68).
The manipulation was therefore successful. Contrary to Study 1, belief in conspiracy
theories was also significantly lower in the anti-conspiracy condition than the control
condition (p = .003, d = .35).
Exposure to Jewish conspiracy theories, prejudice, and discrimination
A one-way ANOVA examined the influence of exposure to conspiracy theories on
affective prejudice. There was a significant omnibus effect, F(2, 170) = 4.03, p = .019,
g2 = .05. Pairwise comparisons confirmed that prejudice was significantly higher in
the conspiracy condition (M = 3.32, SD = 0.94) than the anti-conspiracy condition
(M = 2.80, SD = 1.00, p = .008, d = .54) and the control condition (M = 2.91,
SD = 1.15, p = .034, d = .39). There was no difference in prejudice between the
anti-conspiracy and control condition (p = .545, d = .10). There were no reported
differences on the cognitive dimensions of prejudice (stereotypes and dehumanization
[uniquely human or non-uniquely human], p > .05), so these were not analysed
further.
Another ANOVA examined the influence of conspiracy condition on participants’
intentions to vote for a political candidate who was known to have Jewish ethnic
3 Factor analysis was conducted on the Jewish conspiracy theory and prejudice scales. Statistical assumptions were met, and the
analysis revealed two factors with eigenvalues>1, explaining 46.72% and 27.71% of the variance respectively. Each component
showed strong loadings on the rotated solution, and each item loaded substantially on the predicted scale.
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origin, as a measure of discrimination. Again, there was a significant omnibus effect of
condition, F(2, 170) = 3.29, p = .040, g2 = .04. Specifically, discrimination towards a
Jewish political candidate was significantly higher in the conspiracy condition
(M = 2.30, SD = 1.60) than the anti-conspiracy condition (M = 1.66, SD = 0.98,
p = .013, d = .48), and marginally higher than the control condition (M = 1.88,
SD = 1.37, p = .097, d = .28). Voting intentions did not differ between the anti-
conspiracy condition and control (p = .374, d = .18).
Amediation analysiswas thenconducted to examinewhether the effect of exposure to
conspiracy theories on anti-Jewish discrimination could be explained by increased
prejudice towards this group. This was carried out using Hayes’ (2013) bootstrapping
method for indirect effects, using PROCESS Model 4, including one mediator with 5,000
bootstrapped resamples and a 95% confidence interval with indicator coding. The pro-
conspiracy condition was coded as the reference group and was compared to the anti-
conspiracy condition (D1) and control (D2) separately. Results (see Figure 1) confirmed
that the indirect effect was significant in both cases. When compared to both the anti-
conspiracy condition and the control condition, exposure to conspiracy theories
increased discrimination towards a Jewish political candidate via increases in prejudice
towards this group.
Study 2 provides further support to the prediction that exposure to intergroup
conspiracy theories can increase prejudice towards the group implicated in the
conspiracy. Results are demonstrated in a different intergroup context with a different
target outgroup, and also show that exposure to conspiracy theories not only affects
attitudinal prejudice but also intended behaviour towards the outgroup.4 We also
found, however, that exposure to conspiracy theories may more strongly impact the
affective vs. cognitive dimensions of prejudice. Whilst exposure to conspiracy theories
increased affective prejudice, there was no reported difference on stereotypes or
dehumanization. Nonetheless, Study 2 provides evidence that exposure to intergroup
conspiracy theories can change the way we feel – and potentially behave – towards
implicated outgroups.
STUDY 3
Across two studies, we have experimentally demonstrated that exposure to
conspiracy theories can increase prejudice towards the outgroup implicated in the
conspiracy theory (Study 1), which, in turn, can lead to discrimination towards that
group (Study 2). In Study 3, we examined whether the prejudice-enhancing effect of
conspiracy theories may generalize even beyond the group implicated in the
conspiracy to other, unrelated outgroups. It was expected that exposure to conspiracy
theories about Jewish people may not only increase the level of prejudice towards
Jewish people but that these negative attitudes may then generalize to other
secondary outgroups (an attitude generalization effect; Fazio et al., 2004). Impor-
tantly, if this generalization effect is observed, it would suggest that the detrimental
consequences of conspiracy theories for intergroup relations may be even more wide-
reaching than originally conceived.
4 As in Study 1, we also ran a mediation analysis using indicator coding where we found that exposure to conspiracy theories (vs.
anti-conspiracy vs. control) was indirectly associated with prejudice and discrimination towards Jewish people through increased
belief in conspiracy theories, respectively. This provides confidence that conspiracy theories are driving the reported effects.
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Method
Participants and design
One hundred and twenty-four participants (57 men, 64 women, 2 trans/other, and 1who
would rather not say, Mage = 34.69, SD = 10.88) were recruited online via Prolific
Academic. Participants were all residents of the United Kingdom and received a small fee
in exchange for their participation. As in the previous studies, participants who failed
attention screening measures were removed from the analysis, alongside those partic-
ipants who indicated they were of Jewish origin. The final sample size used for data
analysis was 114 (50 women, 61 men, 2 trans/other, and 1 who would rather not say,
Mage = 34.80, SD = 10.86). The design was refined in Study 3 to focus only on the pro-
conspiracy (n = 52) and control condition (n = 62). Effects in Study 1 and 2 were
consistent in demonstrating an increase in prejudice in the pro-conspiracy condition
relative to the anti-conspiracy condition, so we removed the anti-conspiracy condition in
Study 3. Comparison focused on the difference between thepro-conspiracy condition and
the control condition. A small–medium effect size (d) of 0.54 determined from the
previous studies required a sample size of approximately 110 for 80% power of detecting
the effect. Anticipating participant dropout (which after running Study 1 and 2 on the
same platform was lower than we first anticipated), we targeted 124 participants.
Materials and procedure
In a between-groups design, participants were exposed to either information that
supported conspiracy theories surrounding Jewish people (pro-conspiracy condition) or
Figure 1. A simple mediation test of conspiracy condition (D1, conspiracy versus anti-conspiracy/
conspiracy, versus D2, conspiracy versus conspiracy/anti-conspiracy) on discrimination (DV) through
prejudice towards Jewish people in Study 2 (MV) (N = 173; 5,000 bootstrap samples).Note. First number
represents b statistic, and the second is the SE *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .001.
10 Daniel Jolley et al.
no information (control condition). Participants then completed the same measure of
belief in Jewish conspiracy theories as used in Study 2 by way of a manipulation check
(a = .88). To measure prejudice, participants completed a feeling thermometer scale
(Haddock, Zanna, & Essess, 1993). Participants were asked to indicate how cold
(unfavourable) or warm (favourable) they feel towards Jewish people, in general, on a
scale from0° to 100°. Tomake interpretation of the data easier, the thermometer scalewas
reversed-coded so that higher values indicated high levels of prejudice. Participants then
completed this same measure to indicate their feelings towards a number of other,
secondary groups, specifically Americans, Irish, Australians, Asians, rich people,
feminists, housewives, disabled people, elderly people, Arabs, people on benefits, and
poor people (adapted from Harwood et al., 2011). The order of these secondary groups
was randomized across participants. To conclude, participants completed attention
check questions and were debriefed, thanked, and paid.
Results and discussion
Manipulation check
An independent samples t-testwas conductedwith conspiracy condition (pro-conspiracy
vs. control) as the independent variable and scores on belief in Jewish conspiracy theories
as the dependent variable. As expected, exposure to Jewish conspiracy theories resulted
in significantly higher conspiracy theory belief (M = 2.85, SD = 1.31), compared to the
control condition (M = 2.09, SD = 0.93), t(112) = 3.59, p < .001, d = .67. The manip-
ulation was therefore successful.
Exposure to Jewish conspiracy theories and prejudice
A second t-test confirmed the impact of conspiracy condition onprejudice towards Jewish
people as the dependent variable. As predicted, prejudice towards Jewish people was
significantly higher in the experimental condition (M = 38.25, SD = 21.14) compared to
the control (M = 31.15, SD = 16.10), t(112) = 2.04, p = .044, d = .38.
The generalized consequences of exposure to conspiracy theories were investigated
by examining the indirect path fromexposure to conspiracy theories to prejudice towards
the secondary outgroups through prejudice towards Jewish people.5 The examination of
the indirect path constitutes the most appropriate analysis to examine the generalization
effects as it specifically tests the generalization process in which exposure to conspiracy
theories increases prejudice towards the target outgroup, which then spreads to other,
uninvolved outgroups (for similar procedure, see Harwood et al., 2011; Vezzali &
Giovannini, 2012). This indirect effect was tested using Hayes’ (2013) bootstrapping
method for indirect effects, using PROCESS Model 4, with 5,000 bootstrapped resamples
and a 95% confidence interval. Separatemodelswere performed for each of the secondary
outgroups (12 models in total). Significant indirect effects emerged in each case. Point
estimates and confidence intervals are reported in Table 1, ordered by magnitude of the
indirect effect.
5 A MANOVA was conducted with the conspiracy condition as the independent variable and prejudice towards a variety of other
outgroups as the dependent variables. Exposure to Jewish conspiracy theories influenced prejudice towards people on benefits, F
(2, 110) = 4.84, p = .010,g2 = .07). Specifically, prejudice was higher towards people on benefits in the conspiracy condition
(M = 52.23, SD = 17.78) than the control condition (M = 42.23, SD = 15.47). There were no other direct effects on the
other secondary groups.
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In Study 3, we provide the first evidence that exposure to conspiracy theories not only
increases prejudice towards the outgroup implicated in the alleged conspiracy but also
towards other, uninvolved outgroups. Specifically, our results point to an indirect effect,
such that exposure to conspiracy theories relating to Jewish people increases prejudice
towards secondary outgroups via increases in prejudice towards Jewish people. This
spreading of prejudiced attitudes was apparent across a range of different outgroups
including Americans, Arabs, the elderly, poor people, and people on benefits. Previous
findings suggest that transfer effects emergemost strongly for groups that are perceived to
be similar to theprimary outgroup, and least strongly to dissimilar groups (Harwood et al.,
2011). Interestingly, if we adopt a stereotype content model perspective (Fiske, Cuddy,
Glick, & Xu, 2002) we can see that, generally, indirect effects were strongest for groups
that, along with Jewish people, are classified as high in competence (e.g., Asians, Irish,
Americans, Australians) as opposed to low competence groups (e.g., the elderly, poor
people, people on benefits). Ultimately, however, findings suggest the consequences of
exposure to conspiracy theories for intergroup relations may be much broader than
originally conceived, and capable of reducing more widespread intergroup tolerance.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across three studies, the current research has provided experimental evidence of the
impact of conspiracy theories on intergroup attitudes. In Study 1, exposure to conspiracy
theories about immigrants increased prejudice towards this group. Study 2 replicated
these results in a different intergroup context where prejudice translated into biased
behavioural tendencies towards Jewish people. Study 3 then showed that exposure to
Jewish conspiracy theories not only increased prejudice towards this group but also
indirectly increased prejudice towards a range of other groups.
These findings make a number of important advances on previous work. First,
previous examinations of the association between conspiracy theories and prejudice
have relied on cross-sectional data (e.g., Bilewicz & Sedek, 2015; Golec de Zavala &
Cichocka, 2012; Kofta & Sezdek, 2005;). Here, we offer the first experimental
demonstration of the causal impact of exposure to conspiracy theories on prejudice
towards the implicated outgroup. Findings were replicated in two different intergroup
contexts, not just examining prejudice and conspiracy theories regarding Jewish
people as in previous studies (e.g., Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012; Kofta & Sezdek,
2005), but also European immigrants who represent another group that has been the
subject of conspiracy theories in recent years. In both intergroup contexts, we
provided novel experimental evidence that simply being exposed to conspiracy
theories can impair intergroup relations.
Second, we have demonstrated that exposure to intergroup conspiracy theories can
lead to discriminatory action – in this case, an anti-Jewish voting bias. This finding extends
previous cross-sectional findings (e.g., Bilewicz et al., 2013) and provides evidence for
the assertion by Bilewicz and Sedek (2015) that Jewish conspiracy theories are a strong
predictor of discriminatory intentions. This effect was mediated by increased prejudiced
attitudes. It is clear, therefore, that this research demonstrates the practical consequences
of conspiracy theories in a new domain (e.g., Jolley & Douglas, 2014a,b). The work
extends the psychological work examining conspiracy theories and prejudice by
uncovering the wider impact that exposure to conspiracy theories may have on
intergroup relations.
Intergroup conspiracy theories and prejudice 13
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the current research demonstrates how the
prejudice-enhancing effects of intergroup conspiracy theories are not limited to the group
targeted by the conspiracy but can spread to other, uninvolved groups. In Study 3,
exposure to conspiracy theories relating to the actions of Jewish people was found not
only to increase prejudice towards this group, but also to indirectly increase prejudice
towards other social groups such as Americans, Asians, and Arabs. This effect occurred via
a process of attitude generalization in which conspiracy theories about a particular
outgroup increased prejudice towards them, and these negative attitudes then general-
ized to other, secondary outgroups.
The fact that we did not find a direct effect of exposure to conspiracy theories on
secondary outgroup attitudes does not undermine the validity of our results. It is the
indirect path, in which exposure to conspiracy theories increases prejudice towards
secondary groups through prejudice towards the primary outgroup that provides
evidence of attitude generalization. These findings remind us of the secondary transfer
effects of intergroup contact (e.g., Pettigrew, 2009; Tausch et al., 2010), where this
pattern of indirect effects in the absence of direct effects is similarly common (e.g., Brylka
et al., 2016; Drury, Abrams, Swift, Lamont, & Gerocova, 2017; Harwood et al., 2011;
Vezzali & Giovannini, 2012). Importantly, our findings suggest that conspiracy theories
not only have the potential to increase prejudice towards the group at the centre of the
alleged conspiracy but can transfer to other, uninvolved groups. There is also some
evidence that themagnitude of the effects was stronger in general for groups perceived to
be similar (e.g., highly competent) to the alleged conspirators. Finding strategies that can
break this negative spiral will represent an important challenge for future research.
There are some limitations to the present work that should be acknowledged. First,
although we demonstrate that exposure to conspiracy theories can fuel prejudice and
discrimination; this effect – although small – appears to be stronger for affective versus
cognitive dimensions of prejudice. In Study 2, we found that exposure to conspiracy
theories did not change the stereotypes of Jewish people, nor did exposure to conspiracy
theories lead to the dehumanization of a Jewish person. Research in other areas has
uncovered similar discrepancies between different dimensions of prejudice. For example,
positive intergroup contact has been shown to primarily produce more favourable
outgroup evaluations (affective), which scholars argue is because cognitive dimensions
(e.g., stereotypes) of prejudice aremore resistant to change (e.g., Aberson, 2015;Wolsko,
Park, Judd, & Bachelor, 2003). In future research, the differences between these
dimensions of prejudice and conspiracy exposure could be further explored. Further,
whilst we did have ameasure of discrimination in these studies, we relied on ameasure of
behavioural intentions. We know that intentions do not always correlate strongly with
behaviour (Sheeran, 2002). Future research should, therefore, examine whether
exposure to Jewish conspiracy theories leads to measurable behavioural change towards
the outgroup, such asmaintaining social distance orwithholding resources (e.g., Bilewicz
et al., 2013, who examined a measure of preventing Jewish people from buying land).
Participants in both the pro- and anti-conspiracy conditions read negatively valenced
information about the outgroup in question, specifically their involvement in conspiracies
designed to harm the ingroup. In the pro-conspiracy condition, the text included
statements supporting the validity of the conspiracy theory, whilst the anti-conspiracy
condition included statements refuting the conspiracy. The fact that prejudice was
increased in the pro-conspiracy condition relative to the anti-conspiracy condition
suggests that results are not simply due to an information availability bias, as, in both
conditions, participants are reminded that the outgroup can do harmful things. We were
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also able to show that the pro-conspiracy manipulation enhanced conspiracy beliefs
(relative to the control and anti-conspiracy condition) and that these beliefs mediated the
effect of the manipulation on outgroup prejudice, further increasing confidence in our
account. Of course, however, people are not literalistswhen completing surveys (McCrae
& Costa, 2003); it is possible that the manipulation check items themselves do not
measure genuine conspiracy beliefs so much as a general fear of foreigners. Future
research should include a manipulation of intergroup threat that is non-contingent upon
the conspiracy in pursuit of divergent validity. In a similar vein, the conspiracy
manipulations used throughout this investigation concerned specifically immigrants or
Jewish people involved in terrorist organizations, yet we measured prejudice towards
immigrants and Jewish people generally. Whilst this could be considered a limitation, the
results could be considered further evidence of a generalization effect where exposure to
conspiracy theories relating to one (sub)group subsequently generalizes to other, related
groups.
In the current investigation, we were also unable to examine whether the
experimental manipulation has a long-lasting effect on people’s prejudice and discrim-
ination towards groups. We know that conspiracy beliefs can remain heightened after
2 weeks following exposure to conspiracy theories (vs. control; Kim & Cao, 2016). It is
possible, therefore that exposure to intergroup conspiracy may lead to similar prolonged
effects on outgroup prejudice. Future research could test this possibility. Future research
could also examine the mechanisms underlying the effect of exposure to conspiracy
theories on prejudice.Whilst previous research has argued that perceptions of intergroup
threat drive endorsement of conspiracy narratives (€Unal, 2016; Swami et al., 2018), we
argue that increased perceptions of threatmay also represent amechanism throughwhich
exposure to conspiracy theories increases prejudice. Moderators of the relationship
between conspiracy theories and prejudice should also be explored. For example, the
influence of exposure to conspiracy theories on prejudiced attitudes may be moderated
by prior prejudice held towards the target group (cf. Dhont & Van Hiel, 2011; Hodson,
2011). Onemay expect that the effect of exposure to conspiracy theories about the target
group may be even more pronounced for people who hold stronger initial prejudice. In a
similar vein, prior held conspiracy beliefs may moderate the effect of simple exposure to
conspiracy theories on prejudice. Future research could test this possibility.
Our research demonstrates that exposure to conspiracy theories can increase
prejudice towards the target group, which can then generalize to other, uninvolved
groups. Future research should endeavour to examine avenues to limit the negative
impact of conspiracy theories on intergroup relations. For example, Jolley and Douglas
(2017) found that if participants are exposed to anti-conspiracy material before exposure
to conspiracy theories, this can reduce the negative behavioural consequences of the
conspiracy theories. Perhaps the negative impact of intergroup conspiracy theories could
be lessened when people are aware of anti-conspiracy arguments at an earlier point in
time.
Conclusion
In summary, the current research has demonstrated that exposure to intergroup
conspiracy theories can directly increase prejudice and discrimination. These effects
have been established in two contexts: (1) concerning immigrants and (2) concerning
people of the Jewish faith. Exposure to intergroup conspiracy theories can also lead to
an attitude generalization effect – we showed that Jewish conspiracy theories led to
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increased prejudice towards other groups such as Americans and Arabs. Together, this
research suggests that conspiracy theories can have a widespread negative impact on
intergroup relations. Efforts to reduce prejudice and defuse negative intergroup
relations should, therefore, consider the contribution of popular and pervasive
conspiracy theories.
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